[ANALYSIS] ‘Integrated Deterrence’ in the PH: Advice to prepare for the worst-case scenario
June 30 marks the beginning of the second Marcos administration in the Philippines. What the administration’s foreign policy stance will be has been outlined by the President-elect in several fora during the election campaign. Marcos intends to continue with his predecessor’s stance albeit with a toned-down rhetoric against the US, unlike Duterte, never mind that the US was primarily responsible for driving them out of the country in 1986.
The US is in the same boat as this is the first time they will be dealing with a progeny of a leader who was a victim of their regime-change making a successful political comeback. It will be a learning experience for both parties to be sure.
There is a new addition to the geopolitical lexicon and that is integrated deterrence. Joe Biden just concluded his first Asian trip as the American President and announced a new economic grouping called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. It is unclear if this is the replacement of the scuttled Trans-Pacific Partnership launched by the Obama administration but cancelled by Trump. The IPEFP is also different from the Quad, which is a security alliance between the US, India, Japan and Australia, though all three are included in the IPEFP.
The economic alliance is part of the integrated deterrence concept which aims to wean off members of ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia from the sphere of Chinese influence by offering expanded trade options with the US as opposed to prevailing situation where China is the largest trade partner of the countries in the region.
Unfortunately, Biden again triggered China by categorically stating that the US would come to Taiwan’s defense if Beijing makes good on its vow to take Taiwan back, which it views as a renegade province. The Taiwanese are not as pliable as mainland Chinese in Hong Kong and Macau, both of which are Special Administrative Regions. It is unlikely that Taiwan would willingly return to the Chinese fold. The same goes with Beijing allowing Taiwan to become an independent state.
Marcos has stated that he will always have the interest of the Philippines first and foremost over that of the competing superpowers. China was the first to recognize Marcos’ victory at the polls and Xi Jin Ping was also the first to send his personal congratulations to the President-elect through the Chinese Ambassador and later on in a videoconference between the two leaders. The US followed suit shortly but Biden’s trip did not have a stop in the Philippines for obvious reasons. Duterte did not deem it fit to attend the US-ASEAN Summit in Washington. He opted to send Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin in his stead. This makes Duterte the only President who did not visit the US in a working capacity or on a state visit even if he was invited to do so by then President Trump.
To be sure, Marcos, like Duterte, may still wish to explore renegotiating certain aspects of the alliance. During the debate, he noted, “I think any of these agreements we should, of course, encourage as long as it is very clear to us: What is the advantage for the Philippines?” Hence, it is possible that Marcos’s future defense secretary, whoever he or she may be, will follow in the footsteps of outgoing Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, who repeatedly called for a “review” of the Mutual Defense Treaty. But if Marcos’s government does launch a review process, it will likely be in good faith to improve Manila’s benefits within the alliance rather than trying to find ways to terminate it. Either way, Marcos is unlikely to seek U.S. support against China unless absolutely required. In one interview, he said, “The problem is between China and us. If the Americans come in, it’s bound to fail because you are putting the two protagonists together.”
Marcos’s hesitance to involve the U.S. military in future potential conflicts with China should not be a source of concern in Washington. Unlike Duterte, Marcos appears to highly value the alliance. In fact, he might be arguing for Manila to do more on its own—a development, if it comes to pass, that should be embraced by Washington. It would fit neatly into the Biden administration’s strategy of so-called integrated deterrence, in which U.S. allies and partners work together to deter China and other adversaries, such as Russia.
Of course, all these statements are just that—statements. Marcos will have to match his words with deeds in the coming years to demonstrate that he actually plans to defend Philippine sovereignty against China and prioritize the U.S. alliance. It is likely he will do both, not least because of the overwhelmingly pro-U.S. sentiment among the Philippine population, the military leadership, and other constituencies. These basic facts of Philippine politics—coupled with Beijing’s rising assertiveness against Manila’s interests in the South China Sea, which shows no signs of abating—made Duterte’s pro-China gambit politically dead on arrival. Hence, Marcos is likely to tweak Duterte’s foreign policy just enough to avoid the same pitfalls and maximize the strategic benefits to the Philippines. Derek Grossman The Rand Corporation
But as Tonosaki writes in the embedded Rappler article, the US is an unreliable and inconsistent ally for the Philippines unlike Japan. During the tenure of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Philippines and Japan embarked on a capacity-building defense program. The results can be quantified in the recent additions of patrol vessels for the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources along with patrol aircraft for both the Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy.
In contrast, the US has made it impossible for the Philippines to purchase defense materiel what with the cost of F-16 multi-role fighters and naval vessels, both of which the US have stockpiles of and can be made available under less onerous terms if the US really wanted to.
China is not willing to supply the Philippines with military equipment for obvious reasons but has made up for this through outright donations of equipment and foodstuff during natural disasters, official development loans from the AIIB and vaccines at the height of the pandemic. There is also infrastructure with the recent completion of the Binondo-Intramuros and Estrella-Panataleon Bridges.
It does not help also that the US is still funding certain media outlets such as Rappler and Vera Files and several other NGOs through the National Endowment for Democracy, which are involved in the promotion of human rights and leftist-militant groups which advocate the overthrow of the duly-elected government.
Duterte’s foreign policy was not dead on arrival. It gave the Philippines option as he played one country against the other, indirectly. He struck a delicate balance betwen the Chinese dragon and the American eagle, in the best interest of the country with great success. The Philippines gained back the respect of its peers in ASEAN and the policy of rapprochement towards China moved diplomatic relations back to the same level, if not closer, before the belligerency of the Aquino administration, which caused a wide rift to develop between the two countries.
Analysts have not made much of Biden’s first foray into Asia. The categorical statement that the US will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack will only serve to heighten tensions in the South China and East China Seas. Biden’s national security team moved this back last year when Biden committed the same gaffe. It is unlikely now that China will look at it as another indicator of Biden’s deteriorating mental health.
Marcos’ foreign policy will not vary much from Duterte’s. The language will be more diplomatic most definitely as Marcos is not a firebrand like Duterte who speaks what is on his mind and let’s the whole world know about it.
It will still be in the best interest of the Philippines at this crucial juncture when the first priority is economic recovery and dealing with the spillover effect of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine which the US is also responsible for, to maintain the status quo between the US and China and remain active in ASEAN which negotiates as a regional bloc with China on various issues.
Marcos has not announced who will be his Secretary of Foreign Affairs. More than likely it will be Jose Manuel Romualdez, his cousin and current Philippine Ambassador to the US. Romualdez is well-qualified for the post with his background and experience. He is the third Romualdez to become Ambassador to the US, being preceded by his uncle Eduardo and cousin Benjamin, the younger brother of former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
Comments